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In this paper we argue that parties shape their supporters’ views about the political system
via the messages they communicate about the desirability of the political system. Moreover,
we contend that the effectiveness of such communication varies considerably across
generations. Combining data from election surveys collected in 15 democracies as part of the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project with data on the policy positions of
116 political parties collected by the Comparative Manifestos Project, we ﬁnd that supporters
of parties that express positive positions toward the political system report systematically
higher levels of political legitimacy than supporters of parties that communicate negative
views. Moreover, this communication is particularly effective among older party identiﬁers
whose partisan identiﬁcation tends to be more pronounced. Taken together, these ﬁndings
suggest that political parties play an active role in shaping citizens’ views of the political
system but their success in mobilizing consent among citizens in contemporary democracies
may weaken with partisan de-alignment and generational change.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Like a good bottle of wine, good democratic citizenship
seems to come with ripe old age. It is well known, for
example, that older citizens in established democracies are
more likely to participate inpolitics (e.g. Franklin, 2004;Blais,
2000; Dalton, 2008),1 exhibit more crystallized political
orientations, more stable party identiﬁcations (Campbell
et al., 1960: 153–156; Miller and Shanks, 1996: 131–132;
Sears and Funk, 1999), and report more positive attitudes
about the political parties they feel close to as well as the
political system in which these parties compete (Dalton,
2004; 2005; Holmberg, 2003). Whether they result from
life-cycle or generational effects (or some combination of the
two), the attitudes and behaviors of older citizens consis-
tently reveal a more supportive stance toward politics and
the existing political status quo (Hooghe, 2004). Older indi-
viduals, so it seems, provide the backbone of contemporary.edu (C.J. Anderson),
Hansen (2012).
. All rights reserved.democracies, while younger citizens often are the sources of
instability, innovation, and change.2
While correlations between age and political behavior
are well documented in the scholarly literature (for an
overview, see van der Brug and Kritzinger, 2012), it is not
entirely clear how they ﬁt into dominant accounts of
political legitimacy, in part because they say precious little
about voters’ age, except for the descriptive inference that
older voters havemore faith in the political system. Instead,
the most common explanation of how citizens come to
form supportive attitudes of democratic systems relies on
Eastonian notions of system outputs, which suggest that
such attitudes are shaped by what political systems
represent and how they perform: people are said to extend
greater legitimacy to political systems that produce supe-
rior outcomes (economic, political, and the like), and that
do so fairly in citizens’ eyes.2 Younger voters, however, have the advantage of being more adapt-
able to party system changes, as Franklin and van Spanje (2012) show
using evidence from Italy.
3 In the rational choice perspective, such an attachment is more of
a cognitive short cut representing a running tally of retrospective
assessments of party performance (Fiorina, 1981).
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with available evidence, it presumes that all citizens are
equally affected by these outcomes. It suggests that partisans
of all stripes are expected to see the outcomes of political
systems in a similar light, and they do so regardless of age or
partisan inclination. Given the passionate debates and
disagreements between partisans of all ages about whether
the state of the economy is good or bad or the government
doing a superior or pitiful job, this is unlikely to beuniversally
true. But as importantly, as we argue below, such accounts of
system support too often ignore the role political elites can
play in shaping what voters see and think about. We seek to
remedy these shortcomings by building on the model
developed by Anderson and Just (2010) that shows how
political parties contribute to partisans’ legitimacy beliefs. In
line with their perspective, we argue that parties’ positions
inﬂuence their supporters’ attitudes about the political
system via the messages they communicate about the desir-
ability of the political regime. Moreover, as we argue in this
study, the effectiveness of party persuasion on their
supporters is considerably mediated by individuals’ age, as
older partisans are more receptive to party messages than
younger partisans.
To test our argument, we examine individual level
survey data together with data on parties’ policy positions
in a broad set of established democracies. Our results reveal
that supporters of parties with more positive positions
toward the system report systematically more positive
attitudes about the political system than supporters of
parties that take negative positions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
this communication is particularly effective among party
identiﬁers who are older. These arguments and ﬁndings
have implications for how we view democratic legitimacy
because they imply that partisan legitimacy is actively
shaped by political elites and thus can be mobilized “from
above”. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that political
parties play an active role in shaping citizens’ views of the
political system but their success in mobilizing consent
among citizens in contemporary democracies may weaken
with partisan de-alignment and generational change, as
partisans tend to express more positive attitudes than non-
partisans, and partisans of younger age are less receptive to
party cues than older partisans.
We proceed as follows. The next section explains how
partisanship and system support may be connected, and the
role age may play in connecting the two; we then explicate
several hypotheses, which we subsequently test with data
from15 contemporary democracies. A ﬁnal section discusses
our ﬁndings and concludes.
1. Parties, partisanship, and system support
While studies of democratic stability have frequently
assigned an important role to political parties and the
actions of political elites in shaping the stability and legit-
imacy of democracies (e.g., Bunce, 2003; Geddes, 1999;
Przeworski, 2005; Weingast, 1997), research on political
behavior has paid relatively less attention to parties when
seeking to explain people’s beliefs about the political
system. In particular, to date the literature on political
legitimacy has paid limited attention to the role politicalparties play in shaping citizens’ views about the political
system.
To the extent that parties have played an important role in
building system support, they have done so through what
has been called “parties in the electorate.” Since the behav-
ioral revolution in political science, partisanship (or partisan
attachment, partisan identiﬁcation) has been a fundamental
organizing concept for understanding political behavior. It is
a major factor in shaping people’s attitudes about politics
and, subsequently, their behavior. Following The American
Voter, party identiﬁcation typically has been conceptualized
as an individual’s enduring affective attachment to a political
party that is the product of early socialization experiences
(Campbell et al.,1960; 1966; Hess and Torney,1967; Franklin
and Jackson, 1983; Franklin, 1984).3 It is a kind of social
identity, reﬂecting the idea that individuals often deﬁne
aspects of the self in reference to secondarygroups in society,
including political parties (Campbell et al., 1960; Ch 6; Green
et al., 2002).
Because partisanship is assumed to reﬂect a psychological
attachment to a political party, the conceptualization of
individuals as partisans does not require their ofﬁcial
membership in a party or other behavioral outcomes, such as
voting for a particular party, although thesemay all be highly
correlatedwith one another (Miller and Shanks,1996).What
is important, however, is that partisanship shapes how new
political information is interpreted. It thus acts as a so-called
“perceptual screen throughwhich the individual tends to see
what is favorable to his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al.,
1960: 133). In otherwords, partisanship canbe interpreted as
a cognitive short cut that assists citizens in managing
complex information and organizing their views about
politics (see also Sniderman et al., 1991).1.1. The role of partisanship in shaping legitimacy
Aside from inﬂuencing how people select and interpret
information, partisanship also provides an anchor for polit-
ical legitimacy beliefs. Given the central role political parties
play in modern democracies, it should be no surprise that
partisans are motivated to accept the political status quo,
including the political regime (its institutions andprocesses).
Compared to non-partisans, partisans express higher levels
of support for the role of political parties in a democracy, the
party system they constitute, and the political order inwhich
they operate (Holmberg, 2003; Miller and Listhaug 1990;
Paskeviciute, 2009).
A number of scholars have argued that this connection
between partisanship and system support can be viewed as
an indicator of the health of democratic political systems
(Dalton, 1996; 1999; Holmberg, 2003; Torcal et al., 2002;
Miller and Shanks, 1996; Budge et al., 1976). In fact, because
of the strong relationship between party identiﬁcation and
support for the political system, some worry that weak-
ening partisan attachments might erode people’s faith in
democratic politics. Scholars are concerned that the decline
4 For useful literature overviews, see Johnston (2006) and Holmberg
(2007).
5 Studies of public opinion based on panel data show that partisanship
causally precedes people’s attitudes and values. For example, analyses of the
interdependence of respondents’ issuepositions (on socialwelfare, race, and
culture) and partisanship show that party attachment inﬂuences people’s
issue positions much more strongly than issue positions inﬂuence parti-
sanship (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Carsey and Layman, 2006). As well,
consistent with the limited evidence that exists about the link between
legitimacy beliefs and partisanship (Koch, 2003), Goren’s (2005) structural
equation model of three-wave panel data reveal that partisanship affects
people’s political values more strongly than the reverse.
6 We employ age to denote a general sense of temporality in the life of
an individual (O’Rand and Krecker, 1990).
7 Unfortunately, the survey does not include questions relating to
respondent’s exposure to politics throughout one’s life time to enable us
to test this idea directly.
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be a leading indicator of citizen disengagement from poli-
tics amongst voters and a decline in support for party-based
democracy more generally (Dalton, 1999: 66; see also
Holmberg, 2003). Similarly, the lack of strong partisan
attachments in newly democratic states is seen as providing
only a weak foundation for system support and its consol-
idation (Dalton and Weldon, 2007).
1.2. The role of parties and party positions
Given the discussion above, the traditional partisan-
ship perspective would expect partisan attachments to
lead to higher levels of political support generally,
regardless of the speciﬁc party voters identify with. After
all, even parties outside of the political mainstream signal
an allegiance to the rules of the democratic game, due to
the very fact that they organize themselves as parties and
contest elections. However, we argue that this overlooks
the obvious fact that partisanship can have a variety of
effects on how people view the political system. Speciﬁ-
cally, we posit that parties differ signiﬁcantly in the
positions they takewith regard to the political system, and
that partisans are predisposed to adopt these positions as
their own. In short, parties differ in their fondness for the
political system, and partisans’ attitudes are likely to
mirror these differences.
We theorize that voters are cognitivemisers. And because
the functioning of the political system is complex and often
arcane, partisanship predisposes individuals to adopt the
political positions of their party on a number of issues.
Importantly for this study, we expect that the positions
parties take about the political system signal to party
supporters howwell the system is performing. In most basic
terms, if a political party takes a more positive position
toward the functioning of the political status quo, its parti-
sans will also express more positive attitudes about the
political system. Conversely, political parties that take
negative positions are also more likely to engender more
negative attitudes about the political system among their
supporters. As a result, parties’ positions (and messages)
about the political system provide the mechanism that links
parties’ policy positions and their supporters’ views of the
desirability of the political regime.
Our argument implies that parties’ positions are exog-
enous to their supporters’ views: that is, the causal arrow is
expected to run from parties’ messages to partisans’ views,
rather than the reverse. We cannot completely rule out that
some individuals may develop a partisan attachment to
parties whose positions on the political system they agree
with. However, we believe that our argument can be
justiﬁed on a number of grounds. First, our expectations
about the role of partisanship as a mover of attitudes about
the political system are plausible and consistent with
considerable amounts of research into the role of parti-
sanship in shaping political behavior. Among these, the
Michigan-based conception of party identiﬁcation as an
“unmoved mover” supports this interpretation: most citi-
zens develop partisan attachments early in life, and these
attachments are strongly resistant to change (Campbell
et al., 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996; see also Green et al.,2002). And while we acknowledge that the stability of
party identiﬁcation is sometimes less than perfect, we also
wish to note that partisanship is a robust mover of people’s
opinions regardless of its stability at the individual level,4
and that research on panel data consistently reveal parti-
sanship to be causally prior to attitudes.5 Taken together,
existing studies strongly suggest that we are on safe
grounds in asserting that partisan attachment increases the
odds that voters rely on the party positions as a guide for
political orientations, and that strong partisanship
augments the persuasive power parties have for their
supporters (Jacoby, 1988; see also Zaller, 1992). As a conse-
quence, our model of party positions, partisanship, and
legitimacy beliefs implies a set of variable effects of parti-
sanship on support depending on, and set in motion by,
parties’ positions on the legitimacy and desirability of the
existing democratic regime.
1.3. Partisan consent across generations
If parties indeed have the capacity to mobilize public
support for the political system, this does not necessarily
imply that party persuasion is equally effective across all
partisans. In particular, wewould expect parties to be more
effective among party supporters who are more receptive
to parties’ messages. We argue that such receptiveness is
more pronounced among partisans that are older, and this
effect is due to both life-cycle and generational effects in
established democracies.
From the perspective of an individual’s life-cycle, age in
established democracies means longer experience with
the functioning of a political system and parties that
operate in it. To put it simply, older individuals have been
around for a longer period of time than younger citizens.6
This means that older individuals have had more oppor-
tunities to be exposed to politics over the duration of their
life span than younger citizens. To be sure, age does not
guarantee exposure to politics, as this process is likely to
be mediated by a host of individual and contextual char-
acteristics, such as individual’s political interest and the
salience of elections. Nevertheless, one could generally
expect that older citizens hold a longer personal memory
of political events and their key actors – such as major
political parties – than younger voters who became
members of their polity only recently.7
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more stable over time,8 then older partisans should also
be more familiar with their parties than younger parti-
sans. What is more, existing research shows that older
people in advanced industrialized democracies report
higher levels of trust in political parties than younger
people (Holmberg, 2003).9 In these democracies, some
argue, value change has led young generations to develop
preferences for more direct and less hierarchical forms of
political engagement than participating through conven-
tional channels of politics dominated by political parties
(e.g. Inglehart, 1984; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987;
Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). It is not surprising then
that young people are less inclined to believe in the
necessity of parties for the functioning of democratic
politics (Holmberg, 2003).
These ﬁndings are important because existing research
shows that familiarity and trust in parties encourage people
to rely on party messages, especially with respect to more
complex issues (Coan et al., 2008). Experimental research
in social psychology demonstrates that familiarity with
a source increases the persuasive impact of messages
communicated by that source (Weisbuch et al., 2003). This
means that prior exposure to a source makes its persuasive
appeal more effective relative to a source that an individual
was not previously exposed to. The relationship between
exposure/familiarity and persuasion is attributed to a two-
step causal process: 1) exposure to a source leads to an
increase in attraction for that source relative to a novel
source; 2) greater source attractiveness then produces
greater acceptance of the source’s message (Cialdini, 1993;
Perloff, 2010; Petty and Wegener, 1998; for literature
review, see Petty et al., 1997). Research on persuasion and
priming similarly demonstrates that trust in a message
sender (or its credibility) has a powerful effect on the
individual’s receptiveness to that message, particularly in
low information and motivation environments (e.g,
Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et al., 1997;
see also Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Miller and Krosnick,
2000). Hence, the more an individual trusts a source the
more likely one will accept a message communicated by
that source as one’s own.8 Existing research suggests that partisan ties – once acquired early in
life through the process of political socialization – become deeply
embedded in an individual’s belief system and tend to strengthened over
one’s life span (Campbell et al., 1960: 153–156; Miller and Shanks, 1996:
131–132; Converse and Markus, 1979; see also Jennings, 2007). The latter
is due to the fact that electoral experience normally reinforces initial
partisan tendencies because most citizens cast their ballots for their
preferred party. The accumulated experience of voting for the same party
and the political agreement that leads to such partisan regularity tend to
strengthen partisan ties. As a consequence, partisan loyalties generally
solidify with age – or, more precisely, with continued electoral support of
the same party (Converse, 1969; 1976). Empirical evidence from panel
studies conﬁrm that age is positively related to partisanship intensity and
stability; and the life-cycle effects remain robust and consistent even
when controlling for generational effects (e.g., Jennings and Markus,
1984; Sears and Funk, 1999; Claggett, 1981; see also Dalton, 2008: ch 9).
9 This relationship, however, is probably due to generational effects
because the pattern is reversed in newer democracies where young
people express more trusting attitudes towards parties than old citizens
(Holmberg, 2003).If age among partisans is associated with greater famil-
iarity with one’s party and higher levels of trust in it, as
shown in previous research, then partisans of older age
should be more inclined to rely on party cues than younger
partisans.10 Note that this means we expect age to play two
roles (though we focus on only one): ﬁrst, we know from
extant research that age is associated with more stable and
more pronounced partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960: 153–
156; Miller and Shanks, 1996: 131–132; Sears and Funk,
1999); second, we expect age to act as a moderator, with
older voters making processing information more in line
with their partisan predisposition.
We therefore expect party positions and age to interact in
shaping partisans’ attitudes about system legitimacy.
Speciﬁcally, we posit that the effects of party positions on
supporters’ views should be particularly pronounced among
older partisans and less pronounced among younger parti-
sans. This means that while positive party positions about
the system generally have a positive effect on satisfaction
with democracy of their supporters, this effect should be
more sizable among older than younger partisans.
2. Data and measures
Testing our hypotheses about the potential heterogeneity
in partisans’ views of the political system within countries
requires thatwe combine and analyze data about individuals
and political parties. We use surveys collected as part of the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project
(Module 1, 1996–2000) to measure partisanship, age, and
system support at the level of individuals, and combine these
with data onparty positions from theComparativeManifestos
Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al., 2006). We were able to
collect and combine public survey and party indicators for
116 political parties in a broad set of 15 established democ-
racies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United
States).11 Below, we describe the critical individual level
variables (partisanship, age group, and system support) and
the key party-level variable, a party’s position about the
political system.2.1. Voters
2.1.1. System support
Wemeasure citizen support for the political systemwith
the help of a CSES survey item capturing respondent’s
satisfaction with the way democracy works in his or her
country (for a discussion of the measure and its properties,10 A contrasting perspective would suggest that if younger individuals
are more malleable, they can be expected to be more affected by party
messages than older citizens. We are grateful to the reviewer for this
observation.
11 Our party and survey data are drawn from different time periods, and
their causal ordering is as our theory implies. Speciﬁcally, the Compara-
tive Manifestos Project data are very close, yet always temporally prior, to
the CSES data. This is because all manifestos are pre-election documents
and CSES surveys in our data are post-election surveys, and the inter-
views were usually carried out shortly after the elections.
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Klingemann,1999; cf. Norris,1999). This indicator focuses on
people’s responses to the actual process of democratic
governance and attitudes toward a country’s “constitutional
reality” rather than democracy as an ideal (Fuchs et al.,1995:
328; Anderson et al., 2005: 41; Linde and Ekman, 2003). The
relevant survey item asked citizens whether they are very
satisﬁed, fairly satisﬁed, not very satisﬁed, or not at all
satisﬁedwith theway democracyworks in their country. The
variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating
a more satisﬁed response.
2.1.2. Party identiﬁcation
The conceptualization and measurement of party iden-
tiﬁcation has long been subject to academic debate
(Campbell et al., 1960; Budge et al., 1976; Fiorina, 1981),
including the question ofwhether the construct is applicable
in countries outside the U.S. Scholars have concluded that
respondents should be given a clear opportunity to register
a “non-identity” (Johnston, 1992; Blais et al., 2001; Sanders
et al., 2002). Thankfully, such a question is available in the
CSES surveys, which asked respondents: “Do you usually
think of yourself as close to any particular party?” Response
categories were coded dichotomously, with 1 indicating
a positive answer and 0 otherwise (no or don’t know).12 This
measure has been shown to be applicable not only in two-
party systems, as in the U.S., but also in multi-party
systems, and it has been shown to be valid across countries
with variable partisan traditions and political institutions
(Holmberg, 1994; 2003; Budge et al., 1976).15 One shortcoming of the CMP data is that they provide measures only
for parties that won two or more seats in parliament, ignoring smaller
parties. To keep at least some smaller parties in our analyses and to test
the robustness of our results to the inclusion of these parties, we did the2.2. Parties
2.2.1. Party position toward the political system
Wemeasure party positions toward the political system
with the help of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)
data collected immediately prior to the CSES survey in each
country.13 To validate the usefulness of the indicator, we
read the original documents that the CMP data are based on
and discovered that statements coded under the rubric of
“constitutionalism” provide the most appropriate indicator
of a party’s stance vis-à-vis the political system, as they
clearly reﬂect party positions about the fundamental rules
of a political regime and maintaining its status quo.14
There are two categories of statements: ﬁrst, “Constitu-
tionalism: positive”, which represents the extent to which
a party supports speciﬁc aspects of the constitution, uses12 An alternative would be constructing a four-category measure of party
identiﬁcation suggested by Holmberg (2003) that not only accounts for the
presence or absence of partisanship but also for its intensity. However,
survey items necessary for creating suchmore ﬁnely-grainedmeasurewere
not available for Belgium, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.We therefore
opted to rely on a dichotomous indicator of party identiﬁcation.
13 The CMP indicators represent percentages of party statements within
party platforms designed to address each of the 56 issues within the CMP
classiﬁcation scheme. Thismeans that the possible range on eachmeasure is
from 0% (when a party does not mention the issue at all) to a maximum
theoretical value of 100% (when all statements within a manifesto focus on
the issue).
14 We are grateful to Andrea Volkens and Paul Pennings for making the
original coded party manifestos available to us.constitutionalism as an argument for policy, as well as
generally approves of the constitutional way of doing things;
and second, “Constitutionalism:negative”,which reﬂects just
the opposite. The statements in these categories commonly
included proposals for institutional changes, such as creating
a presidency with substantial powers (proposed by the
Australian Labor Party in its 1996 manifesto), or resisting
changes in the existing constitutional order on the basis that
it is “the product of hundreds of years of knowledge, expe-
rience and history” (as the UK’s Conservative Party pro-
claimed in its 1997 manifesto).
In reading themanifestos,we also found thatparties often
express support for some aspects of the constitutional order
while criticizing others. Thus, to capture overall party posi-
tions toward the country’s institutional structure,we created
a combined constitutionalism index by subtracting the
percentage of “Constitutionalism: negative” statements from
the percentage of “Constitutionalism: positive” statements.
The resulting variable ranges from10.61 (Bloc Quebecois in
Canada) to 6.69 (the Liberal Party in Canada) in our sample,
with higher values indicating a more positive party position
toward the political system.15 We have incorporated this
variable in the CSES data by assigning its values to all
respondents who identify with political parties.3. Analysis
3.1. Aggregate evidence
Figs.1 and2providepreliminaryevidenceat theaggregate
level of the connectionsbetweenpartymessages andpartisan
views of the political system, as well as links between parti-
sanship, age, and citizens’ attitudes about thepolitical system.
More speciﬁcally, we examined our data to see if party posi-
tions about the political systemare linked to their supporters’
legitimacy beliefs, and whether older partisans express
systematically different views than younger partisans.
We can see whether there are differences in system
support between partisans of different stripes by comparing
average satisfaction with democracy between identiﬁers of
parties that expressed high, medium, and low levels of
support for the constitutional status quo in their country. Asfollowing: we excluded small parties that never appeared in the CMP data
from beginning of its coverage in 1950 until the CSES survey. However,
we kept parties with previous experience of legislative representation,
that is, parties that although they did not appear in the CMP data in the
election just before the CSES survey, they were included in the CMP data
in previous elections. We assigned these parties a value of 0 on the
constitutionalism index, which assumes that they take a neutral position
towards the political system. Since parties without legislative represen-
tation are more likely to be dissatisﬁed with the political system and its
institutions than parties in parliament (please note that our analyses
control for party legislative size), coding them this way offers a conser-
vative test of our hypotheses – that is, it makes it harder to uncover the
expected effects on partisan attitudes toward the political system.
Excluding all small parties from the analyses, however, does not change
our results appreciably, and our inferences remain the same (the results
are available from the authors upon request).
Fig. 1. Satisfaction with Democracy among Partisans by their Party’s Support
for the Constitutional Status Quo.
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with our theoretical priors. Partisans’ attitudes toward the
functioning of the political systemvarywith a party’s level of
support for the constitutional status quo. Speciﬁcally,weﬁnd
that 44 percent of individuals who identify with a partywith
low constitutionalism score (1 Standard Deviation or more
below the average constitutionalism value in our sample of
parties) are dissatisﬁed with the way democracy works in
their country, while only 25 percent of supporters of parties
withmedium constitutionalism score (withinþ/ 1 SD from
the mean), and 10 percent of supporters with high consti-
tutionalism score (1 SD or more above the mean) hold such
views. In contrast, the percentage of satisﬁed partisans
increases from 56 percent to 75 percent when we compare
supporters of parties with low and medium constitution-
alism score, and to 90 percent for partisans of parties with
high constitutionalism score. Clearly, followers of parties that
take positive positions towards the political system see its
performance in a more positive light than partisans whose
parties adopt more negative views.
To examine whether partisans’ age is also related to
individual positions on the desirability of the political
system, we calculated average scores of satisfaction withFig. 2. Satisfaction with Democracy by Partisanship and Age Group.democracy for partisans and non-partisans of different age
groups (Fig. 2). Our calculations show that partisans of any
age are signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with the way democracy
works than non-partisans. However, there also are consid-
erable differences in the patterns of satisfaction with
democracy across different ages within groups of partisans
and non-partisans. While age is positively associated with
system support among partisans, the pattern is reversed for
non-partisans. Speciﬁcally, the average satisfaction with
democracy scores for the oldest and youngest partisan
groups are 1.92 and 1.86 respectively, while the scores for
non-partisans of the same age groups are 1.78 and 1.83.
Taken together, these results suggest that age matters for
people’s legitimacy beliefs, but it matters differently for
partisans and non-partisans.
Finding that age is negatively associated with system
support among non-partisans rejects a simple life-cycle
hypothesis that aging means becoming more conservative
and hence more supportive of the existing political status
quo. If this explanationwere correct thenwewould observe
a positive relationship between age and system support for
both partisans and non-partisans. Instead, what we see is
a diverging pattern, suggesting that partisans are system-
atically different from non-partisans in the way they form
their attitudes about the political system. This also suggests
that focusing on party persuasion and supporters’ recep-
tiveness to party views as people age should be particularly
useful in explaining citizens’ legitimacy beliefs.
3.2. Multivariate estimation strategy
To establish the magnitude and robustness of these
relationships, we proceed to multivariate models of citi-
zens’ legitimacy beliefs. Combining data about parties with
data about individual respondents implies that our dataset
has a multi-level structure (cf. Snijders and Bosker, 1999;
for applications in political science, see Steenbergen and
Jones, 2002). We therefore estimate our models using
multi-level statistical techniques with random intercepts
(to allow for cross-country heterogeneity in levels of citizen
support for the political system), and individuals clustered
at the level of countries.
In these estimations, we controlled for a number of indi-
vidual, party, and country-level characteristics past research
identiﬁed as consistent determinants of system support. We
take into account respondent’s status as government
supporter because citizens who endorsed parties in govern-
ment have been shown to bemore satisﬁed with democracy
in their country than opposition supporters (Anderson et al.,
2005; Anderson andGuillory,1997; Ginsberg andWeissberg,
1978; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Norris, 1999). Similarly, as
respondents who identify with larger parties might express
more positive views towards the political system, we control
for party legislative size, measured as percentage of party
seats in national parliament.
At the individual level, we include respondent’s left-right
self-placement because right-wing ideology is usually
associated with conservatism and stronger support for
political institutions and the existing status quo, while left-
wing orientations – with openness to change and more
critical attitudes towards the political system (Anderson and
C.J. Anderson, A. Just / Electoral Studies 31 (2012) 306–316312Singer, 2008). Furthermore, since radical views usually lead
to more dissatisfaction with a political system and a will-
ingness to mobilize for change (Riker, 1982; Anderson et al.,
2005, ch.5), we include a measure capturing individual’s
distance from the country’s median on the left-right
continuum. In addition, we sought to identify citizens with
a greater stake in the maintenance of the societal status quo
using variables such as income and education, as well as
gender and race,which reﬂect citizens’ socioeconomic status
or political resources (Almond and Verba, 1963; Anderson
et al., 2005: 20). Finally, since positive economic outcomes
tend to strengthen system legitimacy (e.g. Clarke et al.,1993;
Anderson et al., 2005,148; see also Lipset, 1959; Przeworski,
2005), we included individual evaluations of economic
performance as well as countries’ GDP per capita, GDP
growth, and government expenditure (see appendix for
survey question wording and variable coding for all
measures).3.3. Multivariate estimation results
Table 1 reports the results of our base-line and inter-
action effects models where we estimate citizen satisfac-
tion with democracy using age, partisanship, and party
positions towards the political system as predictors
alongside a number of control variables described above.
We ﬁrst report the results for all respondents, that is, both
partisans and non-partisans. To test the impact of party
messages on their partisans’ legitimacy beliefs more
rigorously, we additionally present the results of our
analyses using a more restricted sample of partisans only.
Party views about the political system were added to the
individual level data by assigning partisan respondents in
the CSES survey the value of their party’s position towards
the constitutional status quo from the CMP data.16
The results indicate that partisans whose parties
express more positive positions toward the political
system report higher levels of satisfaction with democ-
racy. Our estimations also show that age and partisanship
have no independent effect on people’s satisfaction with
democracy, as the coefﬁcients of these variables are
positive but fall short of conventional levels of statistical
signiﬁcance.
The interaction models in Table 1 are identical to base
models with one exception: they include an interaction
term between party positions and respondent’s age. The
results reveal that age doesmatter for legitimacy beliefs but
in a less than straightforward way than is commonly
assumed.We ﬁnd that messages about political system that
parties communicate to their supporters are especially
powerful in shaping the attitudes of partisans who are
older. Speciﬁcally, a positive coefﬁcient of the interaction
term indicates that supporters of parties that take positive
positions about the political system are particularly satis-
ﬁed with the way democracy works if they are older. The
results also reveal that the additive terms of party16 Technically, this means that this variable is an interaction term of
partisanship and party position.messages, partisanship, and age are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant when we account for their multiplicative effect.
To test the robustness of our estimations, we re-ran our
models separately for older and younger respondents,
using 60 year olds as a cut-off point. The results (reported
in Table 2) are again in line with our expectations. Party
positions towards the constitutional status quo have
a statistically signiﬁcant effect on both age groups, but the
substantive impact is larger for the older partisans, as
hypothesized. This ﬁnding is reinforced by the results for
partisans only, as the coefﬁcients remain highly statistically
(and even more substantially) signiﬁcant.
The control variables produce results consistent with
prior research. We ﬁnd that identifying with a party that is
in government contributes positively to citizens’ legitimacy
beliefs, although split-sample estimations in Table 2 indi-
cate that the results are driven by a signiﬁcantly more
powerful effect among older citizens. Similarly, partisans of
larger parties express more positive attitudes about their
political system than individuals who reported being close
to smaller parties. The results also show that right-wing
ideological orientations consistently predict more positive
opinions about the functioning of a political regime, while
ideological extremism reduces citizens’ satisfaction with
democracy. Furthermore, citizens’ support for the political
system is stronger in countries with higher GDP per capita
and among citizens who more positively evaluate their
country’s economic performance. Finally, we ﬁnd that
education and income at the individual level increase
people’s satisfaction with democracy, and that men are
more optimistic about the political system than women.
But how much does the combination of age, partisan-
ship, and party positions matter for legitimacy beliefs? To
answer this question, our multivariate results can also be
expressed substantively as predicted changes in the
dependent variable for different values of the independent
variables. Fig. 3 uses the estimates reported in Table 2 to
chart satisfaction with democracy for partisans across
different age groups and their party’s support for the
political system. The ﬁgure indicates predicted values of
satisfaction with democracy (with 95% conﬁdence inter-
vals) when we compare supporters of parties with
1 Standard Deviation below and above the average
constitutionalism score in our sample of parties (1.154
and 1.436), estimated separately for those who are 60 years
old or older, and those below that age.17 Differences in
satisfaction with democracy can be seen as the joint effects
of party identiﬁcation and party positions on people’s
attitudes toward the political system.
The calculations of substantive effects reveal that an
individualwho is 60 years old orolder andwhose party takes
a positive position towards the political system is .098 points
more satisﬁed with the way democracy works than
apartisanof similar age butwhosepartyexpresses anegative
opinion (1.851 vs. 1.949) (Fig. 3). In contrast, the gap in the
levels of system support among partisans of parties with
more and less enthusiastic endorsementof the constitutional17 We hold other variables at their means, and dichotomous variables at
their medians.
Table 1
Multi-level Estimations of Satisfaction with Democracy in 15 Democracies, 1996–2000.
Independent Variables All Respondents Partisans Only
Base model Interaction model Base model Interaction model
Party position toward political system .021***(.005) .012(.014) .025***(.005) .008(.014)
Age .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Party identiﬁcation .011(.017) .011(.017) – –
Party position toward political system * Age – .001*(.000) – .001*(.000)
Government supporter .054***(.016) .055***(.016) .047**(.016) .049**(.016)
Party legislative size .003***(.000) .003***(.000) .003***(.001) .003***(.001)
Left-right self-placement .023***(.002) .023***(.002) .023***(.003) .023***(.003)
Individual left-right extremism .012***(.003) .012***(.003) .006(.004) .006(.004)
Economic evaluations .150***(.007) .150***(.007) .136***(.009) .136***(.009)
Male .022*(.010) .023*(.010) .034**(.013) .034**(.013)
Education .011***(.003) .011***(.003) .009*(.004) .009*(.004)
Unemployed .104***(.025) .104***(.025) .042(.036) .041(.036)
Married .002(.011) .003(.011) .014(.015) .015(.015)
Income .035***(.004) .035***(.004) .026***(.005) .026***(.005)
GDP per capita .021*(.008) .021*(.008) .021**(.008) .021**(.008)
GDP growth .068***(.017) .068***(.017) .034(.021) .034(.021)
Government expenditure .009(.012) .009(.013) .002(.012) .002(.012)
Constant .708*(.351) .716*(.351) .713*(.334) .725*(.335)
Standard deviation of random intercept .183(.038) .183(.038) .170(.036) .171(.036)
Standard deviation of residuals .694(.003) .694(.003) .686(.004) .686(.004)
Number of observations 21,105 21,105 11,559 11,559
Wald X2 (df) 1279.2(16)*** 1285.7(17)*** 607.5(15)*** 614.05(16)***
Note: Results are multi-level (random intercept) linear regression estimates using STATA 11.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent
standard errors; y: p < .1, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001.
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(1.874 vs. 1.908, a difference of .034). Taken together, the
results suggest that party messages about the political
systemmake a difference to partisans’ legitimacy beliefs, and
that this impact varies considerably across different age
groups.184. Discussion
Although modern democracies are party democracies,
political parties have rarely played a starring role in schol-
arly literaturewhen it comes to understanding howcitizens
evaluate the political system. And while older citizens are
consistently more positive in their attitudes about the
political system in established democracies, age has rarely
ﬁgured as an important explanatory variable. This study
was designed to engage these two shortcomings in two
ways. First, we sought to show that political parties play an
important role in shaping citizens’ legitimacy beliefs.
Speciﬁcally, we argued that partisanship provides the crit-
ical link between party elites and party supporters in
transmitting views about the political system. Byexpressing
their positions, parties engender different levels of enthu-
siasm for the constitutional status quo among their18 Although the magnitude of these effects might appear small, its
impact is similar to the effects of many other factors known to be
important determinants of people’s attitudes and that are commonly
observed in individual level analyses. For example, calculating predicted
effects of individual’s income on satisfaction with democracy in the
sample of older individuals (and using values þ/ 1SD from the mean on
the income variable) reveals that income moves the score on the satis-
faction with democracy variable by .064 points (from 1.815 to 1.879),
holding other variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their
medians.supporters. Moreover, we demonstrated that this commu-
nication is particularly effective among older partisans
whose familiarity and trust in political parties increase their
receptiveness to party’s cues. Using survey data collected in
15 countries and data on parties’ positions for 116 parties,
our results conﬁrm that political parties actively shape the
beliefs citizens adopt about the functioning of democratic
governance in their country. However, they also show that
party success in mobilizing consent among citizens in
established democracies varies across partisans of different
ages.
Finding that political parties have the ability to create or
undermine support for the political status quo has important
implications for system legitimacy. Parties have incentives to
express positive views about the political system to the
extent that they are part of the system andwant to sustain it,
especially if they have been its long-term beneﬁciaries (e.g.,
established parties as opposed to newer parties). However,
parties may also have incentives to express negative views,
for example, if they believe that doing sowill help them gain
support andwin an election. Hence, short-term incentives to
support or criticize the status quo of a political systemmight
be at odds with competing long-term incentives.
Among political parties that take non-neutral positions
towards the political system (50 out of 116 political parties in
our sample),19 only 28% (14 parties) communicate negative
views, while the rest (72% or 36 parties) endorse the status
quo of the political system. Hence, we ﬁnd that parties
contribute to system legitimacy more than undermine it.
This means that overall political parties play a positive role19 Excluding parties with a zero value on the constitutionalism index does
not change our ﬁndings (the results available from the authors upon
request).
Table 2
Multi-level Estimations of Satisfaction with Democracy by Generation in 15 Democracies, 1996–2000.
Independent variables All Respondents Partisans Only
60 and older Younger than 60 60 and older Younger than 60
Party position toward political system .025*(.011) .019***(.005) .035**(.011) .023***(.005)
Party identiﬁcation .048(.036) .003(.019) – –
Government supporter .113***(.033) .036*(.018) .087**(.034) .035y(.019)
Party legislative size .001(.001) .003***(.001) .002*(.001) .004***(.001)
Left-right self-placement .025***(.004) .022***(.002) .023***(.005) .024***(.003)
Individual left-right extremism .009(.007) .015***(.004) .009(.008) .005(.005)
Economic evaluations .158***(.015) .142***(.008) .162***(.019) .123***(.011)
Male .029(.022) .023*(.011) .022(.028) .039**(.015)
Education .002(.007) .016***(.003) .006(.009) .014**(.005)
Unemployed .176y(.101) .085***(.026) .151(.151) .025(.037)
Married .013(.024) .005(.013) .038(.030) .014(.017)
Income .026**(.010) .040***(.005) .019(.012) .031***(.006)
GDP per capita .021*(.008) .021*(.008) .023**(.008) .020*(.008)
GDP growth .046y(.027) .070***(.019) .006(.032) .043y(.023)
Government expenditure .021(.013) .004(.013) .010(.013) .001(.012)
Constant 1.094**(.358) .592y(.359) 1.049**(.365) .603y(.347)
Standard deviation of random intercept .178(.039) .187(.039) .171(.039) .176(.038)
Standard deviation of residuals .731(.007) .682(.004) .718(.009) .675(.005)
Number of observations 5009 16,166 3022 8587
Wald X2 (df) 293.5(15)*** 1000.5(15)*** 168.1(14)*** 461.2(14)***
Note: Results aremulti-level (random intercept) linear regression estimates using STATA 11.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard
errors; y: p < .1, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001.
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democracies. However, this role is not guaranteed – it
depends on the number of partisans in the electorate and
their receptiveness to partymessages that inpart dependson
individuals’ age. This means that with declining numbers of
partisans and generational change,20 the role of parties in
mobilizing citizen consent for the political system may
weaken. Moreover, party support for the political system
might not be stable. For example, parties may also reduce
their endorsement of the political system if they face more
challenges to their organizational survival – e.g, as a conse-
quence of growing role of interest groups and the media in
the political sphere of society that undermines the need for
political parties in contemporary democracies (see Dalton,
2008: 186). And while understanding the causes of party
support for the political system is beyond the focus of our
study, it certainly deservesmore attention in future research.
By integrating research on partisanship, parties, age,
and legitimacy, we sought tomake a contribution to each of
these literatures. Regarding democratic legitimacy, our
ﬁndings suggest that parties clearly have the capacity to
mobilize public consent or dissent from above. Thus,
legitimacy is as much a process of bottom-up politics
where citizens hold the political system accountable for its
performance, as it is a process of top-down politics where
strategic elites seek to further their own goals, sometimes
at the expense of the broader body politic. We need not
resort to extreme examples like the failure of the Weimar
Republic to appreciate this point – examples of party elites
shaping the views of their supporters abound in a variety of
policy areas (e.g., Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Gabel
and Scheve, 2007). Whether this mobilization of consent is
desirable is a normative question that hitherto has not been20 See also Walczak et al. (2012) and Wagner and Kritzinger (2012) for
evidence of de-alignment among the younger generations.asked. We suggest that, at a minimum, it is worth thinking
about.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the conse-
quences of parties’ policy positions. While these have mostly
been studied from a cross-national perspective with an eye
toward the quality of democratic representation (Kim et al.,
2010; McDonald and Budge, 2005), or how the translation of
voters’ preferences into government policy promises shapes
public support for the political system (Paskeviciute, 2006),
our study suggests that parties’positions on the functioningof
the political system can also be fruitfully understood to form
the foundations of citizens’ legitimacy beliefs, particularly
among individuals more receptive to party cues.
But age enters this story in a complexway.We show that
older partisans in established democracies are moreFig. 3. Predicted Effects of Party Support for Constitutional Status Quo and
Individual’s Age on Partisan Satisfaction with Democracy.
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is, as a result of the positions parties take about the political
system. This means that parties are better able to success-
fully inﬂuence their older identiﬁers whomore readily take
their cues from them. In a curious way, then, our ﬁndings
reinforce Dalton’s concerns that a loosening of the
connection between political parties and citizens observed
in established democracies may undermine mass support
for the democratic governance. And this is likely to happen
not only because decline in partisanship through genera-
tional replacement weakens citizen attachment to a polit-
ical system generally (Dalton, 1999). Given that political
elites are usually more supportive of democratic principles
than are ordinary citizens (Sullivan et al., 1993; Converse
and Pierce, 1986), support for the political system may be
eroding also because fewer citizens will be receptive to the
positive messages parties may articulate about the political
system.Moreover, and perhapsmore importantly, our study
shows that party messages are less effective in shaping
system support attitudes of younger partisans. Thus, with
partisan de-alignment and generational change legitimacy
from above might be harder to come by. What this means
for the future of democratic politics remains to be seen.
Appendix. Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can
be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.electstud.
2011.11.003.
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